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I 
A NEW KIND OF COURAGE 
The event was a conference in the Colorado high country on the 
true costs of fighting wildfires in the wildlands/urban interface 
(WUI).1 Rural fire district chiefs, fire marshals, and emergency 
responders in western Colorado attended the conference. Among 
other things, the attendees expressed concern that little to no attention 
was being paid to the hidden human costs—to both the public and 
their firefighters—being incurred by the growing WUI wildfire 
menace. 
After a workshop I offered on the human costs of wildland fire 
fighting, one of the fire marshals (who shall remain anonymous) 
summarized a view I had heard from several others. What’s needed 
now, he said, is a new kind of courage—a form of courage different 
from that which empowers us to frontally attack walls of fire ten to 
twenty times our height in some of the West’s most flammable 
forests.2 For too long, he charged, fire marshals and fire chiefs have 
stood by while county commissioners and city councils approved 
rural subdivisions firefighting professionals knew were basically 
indefensible.3 
He continued by observing that it might end his career to stand up 
before these leaders and tell them what they and their developer 
 
1 Colorado Wildland Fire Conference, NW. FIRE SCI. CONSORTIUM, http://www.nwfire 
science.org/events/colorado-wildland-fire-conference-2015 (last visited Apr. 24, 2018). 
2 Fire Marshal, Colorado Wildland Fire Conference 2015 (Sept. 24−26, 2015). 
3 Id. 
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friends don’t want to hear.4 He added that they weren’t paying him 
enough to bury their mistakes and his firefighters along with them.5 
There are some fires that shouldn’t be fought, he asserted, because 
there are some developments in the WUI that shouldn’t have been 
built in the first place.6 
He was referring to what his colleagues call “suicide subdivisions”: 
housing developments in forested areas with only one narrow winding 
road providing ingress and egress, and inadequate water supplies.7 
Residents stand a greater risk of losing their lives trapped in their 
homes in such circumstances, and the risk to firefighters trying to 
save them is much higher as well.8 In this view, sending crews and 
equipment into such settings, without multiple escape routes and little 
room to maneuver vehicles, is sending them on a suicide mission. 
Anecdotal evidence indicates that, increasingly, rural wildfire 
incident commanders are declining to submit their crews to such 
unacceptable threats.9 The reason is that it is not a “natural disaster” 
that has exposed their crews to such imminent endangerment. It is 
development-driven local government land use decision making—
decisions that knowingly expose the residents of these subdivisions, 
and the first responders who rush to their rescue, to heightened risk of 
wildfire exposure.10 
This Article had its genesis at that conference. The more I listened 
to the stories commanders told about risking their crews and 
equipment fighting such fires, often at public cost many times the 
value of the vulnerable homes they were trying to save, the more I 
realized that they were reaching the same conclusion I was—the 
political and market forces driving residential development and 
wildfire management in the WUI are tragically misconceived. They 
 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Christi Turner, A Wildfire Forum Takes Radical Approach to Protecting Wildland-
Urban Interface, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Feb. 6, 2014), http://www.hcn.org/blogs/goat/ 
behind-closed-doors-wildfire-solutions-forum-takes-radical-approach-to-protecting-wui    
-from-wildfire. 
8 See discussion infra Part IV. 
9 See, e.g., Fernanda Santos, Opinion Editorial, Some Wildfires Simply Can’t be Fought, 
L.A. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2017, 4:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-santos  
-some-wildfires-cant-be-fought-20170806-story.html. 
10 See discussion infra Part II. 
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are inflicting a deadly toll on both WUI residents and those who seek 
to protect them, and something needs to change. 
Additionally, I was listening only to the stories of local government 
fire district commanders in rural communities fighting fires on private 
lands immediately abutting our public lands. Wildfires, like wildlife, 
are utterly disrespectful of property boundaries and political 
jurisdictions; they follow their sources of sustenance. Federally 
trained, equipped, and financed firefighting crews in the U.S. Forest 
Service (USFS), National Park Service, and Bureau of Land 
Management work alongside their local counterparts to first and 
foremost protect human lives, and then property.11 They also manage 
wildfires deep in the back country of our national forests, national 
parks, and other public lands. 
On public lands, wildfire is not regarded as an inherent threat, but 
as a naturally occurring phenomenon, like thunderstorms, floods, and 
earthquakes.12 Fire is one of the means by which forested lands rid 
themselves of pests, diseases, and unhealthy undergrowth, thus 
rejuvenating the soil and opening conifer cones for the propagation of 
the next generation of the forest.13 But for the need to keep 
backcountry fires from becoming too large and threatening rural 
communities at the forests’ edge, many federal land managers would 
prefer to simply let these fires play their traditional ecological role of 
destruction and rejuvenation.14 
This Article is about the relationship between wildfire management 
policies at federal, state, and local levels of government in the 
Mountain West, and the health and well-being of wildland firefighters 
employed by those governments. Part II, Sections A and B below, 
address the narratives dictating the policies that form the increasingly 
dangerous conditions in which wildland firefighters (WLFFs) practice 
their craft. Following that is a closer examination of the harms—both 
physical and behavioral—that are being inflicted on these courageous 
people by way of these policies. Finally, the Article closes with 
 
11 See U.S. FOREST SERV., 2016 WILDLAND FIRE RISK MANAGEMENT PROTOCOLS: A 
VISION FOR RISK MANAGEMENT IN FIRE 1 (2016), https://www.fs.fed.us/r1/fire/nrcg 
/wfdss/NR%20Support%20Docs/2016%20Fire%20Risk%20Management%20Protocols 
.pdf (last visited Apr. 26, 2018) (stating that life comes first and the Forest Service cannot 
accept any lost of life in wildland firefighting). 
12 See HAROLD H. BISWELL, PRESCRIBED BURNING IN CALIFORNIA WILDLANDS 
VEGETATION MANAGEMENT 38–60 (1989). 
13 See id. at 58–60. 
14 Id. 
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recommendations on rewriting the narratives and policies that control 
wildland fire management and inflict unacceptable, unnecessary 
harms on our WLFFs. The last section will also offer alternative 
policy solutions that can measurably alleviate the suffering being 
endured by these public servants and those who care for them. 
II 
CONTESTED LANDS AND COMPETING POLICY NARRATIVES (I): 
REGULATING PRIVATE LAND USE FOR COMMUNAL WILDFIRE 
MITIGATION 
A. Contested Lands 
The interface between public open space wildlands and private 
landholdings ripe for residential development is a contested 
landscape. It is also a landscape of mutual consumption. In West 
Coast and Mountain West states, the WUI is almost universally the 
fastest growing zone of residential land development, at the expense 
of open space and wildlife habitat.15 These areas also happen to be the 
most fire-prone landscapes in the western United States, creating 
measurably heightened risks for both the people who choose to live 
there and the first responders who try to save them when natural 
disasters inevitably strike.16 As slice-and-dice residential land 
conversion steadily eats away at open space, habitat, and forested 
lands, those landscapes occasionally return the favor by consuming 
whole neighborhoods in raging megafires.17 
What political scientists and planners call “growth machine 
politics” has resulted in the increasingly rapid consumption of open 
space18—the very quality that may draw some property purchasers to 
the WUI in the first place. But consumption is a two-way street. The 
 
15 New Analyses Reveal WUI Growth in the U.S., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. FOREST. 
SERV., https://www.nrs.fs.fed.us/data/wui/ (last modified Feb. 16, 2018). (This research 
showed that some of the most rapid WUI residential development was happening in some 
of the most fire-prone areas of the West.). 
16 See S.M STEIN ET. AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. FOREST. SERV., WILDFIRE, 
WILDLANDS, AND PEOPLE: UNDERSTANDING AND PREPARING FOR WILDFIRE IN THE 
WILDLAND-URBAN INTERFACE 1 (2013), https://www.fs.fed.us/openspace/fote/reports 
/GTR-299.pdf. 
17 See generally MICHAEL KODAS, MEGAFIRE THE RACE TO EXTINGUISH A DEADLY 
EPIDEMIC OF FLAME (2017). 
18 See ANDREW E.G. JONAS & DAVID WILSON, THE URBAN GROWTH MACHINE 
CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES, TWO DECADES LATER 3–4 (1999). 
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deeper into the WUI private land development penetrates, the greater 
the threat of those developments’ destruction by fire.19 
Lands in the WUI are also a field of contest over two sets of 
competing policy narratives: those which inform land use regulation, 
and those which inform wildfire management practices.20 Conflicts 
between these two forms of narrative have created ambiguous and 
conflicting policies and management regimes, sometimes with tragic 
consequences.21 In the last quarter century, the greatest single-event 
losses of life among WLFFs have been crews fighting wildfires in the 
WUI.22 A closer examination of these narratives and their resultant 
policies reveals why this is so. 
B. Competing Land Use Policy Narratives 
In 2012, graduate students at the University of Colorado’s School 
of Public Affairs conducted a comparative assessment of state laws 
and local ordinances regarding wildfire mitigation in the WUI in 
seven states in the U.S. Mountain West.23 The choice of states for the 
sample24 represented considerable variation in regulatory approaches. 
Their wildfire mitigation regimes were based on two competing 
policy narratives—the commons and primacy of property. Both 
narratives are deeply rooted in the jurisprudence of American 
property law. 
1. The Commons 
The principle of the commons has early roots in the British 
common law tradition.25 It refers to lands and resources collectively 
held by rural village folk: pasturage, cropland, and an assured water 
 
19 See discussion infra Part V. 
20 See discussion infra Part II.C. 
21 See discussion infra Part V. 
22 See discussion infra Part II.C.4. 
23 See generally Lloyd Burton, Wildfire Mitigation Law in the Mountain States of the 
American West: A Comparative Assessment (Univ. of Colo. Denver, Sch. of Pub. Affairs 
White Paper, July 2013), http://www.dora.state.co.us/taskforce/Documents/Articles 
Studies/WhtPprIntrstStdy15jul13.pdf (Graduate students conducted this research in a 
seminar about disaster law taught by this author. Part II of this article has been adapted 
from a White Paper produced during that course, PUAD 5450, Law of All-Hazards 
Management.Students doing case study research and contributing to this research report 
were Laura Bravo, Vanessa Carter, Tony Gherardini, Rachel Gibbons, Barett Howell, Fred 
Korb, Kimberly Pino, and Ray Sorensen.).  
24 Id. at 11 (Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, and Utah). 
25 See Commons, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1968). 
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supply being chief among them.26 In her Nobel Prize-winning 1990 
book, Governing the Commons, Elinor Ostrom provided case studies 
of many such “common-pool resource” commons that communities in 
cultures around the globe have been sustainably managing for 
hundreds of years, including pastures, fisheries, and watersheds.27 The 
success of these arrangements has relied on agreed upon management 
rules reciprocally enforced within the community, including the 
ability to exclude uninvited entrants into the commons.28 Thus, while 
Tragedy of the Commons essayist Garrett Hardin may have been a 
gifted biologist and compelling essayist, he was certainly no historian 
since he was not actually describing a communally managed 
commons, but one in which individuals could exploit it heedlessly for 
their own ends and with no structures for self-governance.29 
New England colonial villages as well as those throughout 
Pennsylvania operated on the principles of common pool resource 
management—the still existing town squares serving as a historical 
remnant of what were originally much larger commonly held and 
managed open spaces.30 Although the tradition of the commons 
eventually yielded to the privatization of land ownership and 
management, it still retains some contemporary significance. One 
such example is that of commonly managed water resources, such as 
rural conservancy districts and acequias in the western United States. 
Another is the public lands themselves. About twenty-five percent of 
the land mass of the United States is collectively owned by the people 
of the United States (nearly all of it in the western states), and is 
managed on the people’s behalf by agencies such as the Bureau of 
Land Management, the National Park Service, and the USFS.31 The 
public lands are our national commons.32 
 
26 ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS 
FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 2–3 (1990). 
27 Id. at xi. 
28 Id. at 30. 
29 See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968) 
(proposing a theory of the commons in which the shared use of resources results in 
overconsumption). 
30 OSTROM, supra note 26, at 224 n.3. 
31 America’s Public Lands−These Lands Are Your Lands, THE WILDERNESS SOC’Y, 
https://wilderness.org/sites/default/files/Fact%20Sheet%20America%27s%20Public%20 
Lands%20.pdf (last visited Apr. 26, 2018). 
32 LLOYD BURTON, WORSHIP AND WILDERNESS: CULTURE, RELIGION, AND LAW IN 
PUBLIC LANDS MANAGEMENT 193 (2002). 
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This pattern of ownership has some significant implications for the 
management of wildfire in the forested areas of the West. For 
example, federal public land management goals (including fire 
management on those lands) are not always congruent with those of 
local government and private property owners bordering on public 
lands. The same can hold true for state and municipal parkland 
holdings in the WUI. 
The ability of local governments to regulate private behavior in the 
public interest took constitutional form in the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
1824 decision in Gibbons v. Ogden.33 In this landmark case, Chief 
Justice John Marshall was the first American jurist to detail the 
concept of police power—the plenary powers state governments have 
to govern on behalf of their residents34—reserved to the states by the 
tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.35 State and local 
government authority to protect the “public health, safety, morals, and 
welfare” has come to be understood at law to comprise the “inherent 
powers” governments of general jurisdiction should be understood to 
possess for them to be capable of performing the functions for which 
they were established. 
It was in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that the 
police powers first came into their own legally as effective 
instruments of governance—most importantly, in the realm of disaster 
prevention. The Industrial Age precipitated rapid urbanization, with 
low-wage workers living in increasingly squalid tenement conditions. 
As a result, two kinds of disaster struck with increasing force and 
frequency: those associated with public health, and with fire.36 
In response, municipal governments created public health and fire 
departments and granted them unprecedented authority to regulate 
private behavior in the public interest. Public health codes and fire 
codes came into being, along with public health officers and fire 
marshals to enforce them, and the courts regularly upheld their 
enforcement actions. 
The rationale for both this exercise of government authority and 
the courts’ defense of it was that no person or corporation should be 
allowed to use their property in a way that could foreseeably cause 
 
33 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824). 
34 Id. at 17−18. 
35 U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
36 See generally PETER HOFFER, SEVEN FIRES: THE URBAN INFERNOS THAT 
RESHAPED AMERICA (2006). 
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harm to one’s neighbors or to the community at large, whether the 
harm was in the form of a public health nuisance or the threat of 
fire.37 Then, in a landmark ruling in 1926, the U.S. Supreme Court 
held that these powers extended beyond simply preventing public 
endangerment to general land use planning and zoning.38 State 
governments quickly followed this ruling with statutes empowering 
their cities to engage in comprehensive planning and zoning.39 
2. Primacy of Property 
Even as the early decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court were 
affirming the authority of government to regulate private behavior in 
the public interest, so too had the ratifiers of the U.S. Constitution 
sought to limit the authority of the federal government over the 
ownership and use of their property. The last clause of the Fifth 
Amendment states that no one shall be “deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation.”40 
About a century later, the Due Process and Equal Protection 
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment extended these limitations on 
governmental authority to local governments.41 Thus, from the early 
1800s to the present day, but especially over the last century or so, we 
have seen hundreds of decisions handed down by state and federal 
courts adjudicating the relationship between the police powers of state 
and local government and the freedom to use one’s property as one 
pleases. 
This “primacy of property” narrative, as it might be called, 
basically holds that in the realm of land use regulation, that 
government which governs least governs best. On this view, it should 
be left to individual property owners to determine the degree to which 
they will or will not mitigate their own property from the threat of 
wildfire, regardless of the endangerment their inaction may impose on 
their neighbors. 
  
 
37 Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 53–54. 
38 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 396−97 (1926). 
39 William A. Fischel, An Economic History of Zoning and a Cure for its Exclusionary 
Effects, 41 URB. STUDS. 317, 319 (2004). 
40 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
41 U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. 
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C. Applying the Narratives to Private Land Use Regulation in the 
WUI 
Most states of the Mountain West are experiencing the fastest 
population growth in their wildland-urban interfaces, even as these 
are becoming increasingly dangerous places to live.42 Thus, a good 
deal of fire science research is devoted to the study of how WUI 
residents can best mitigate against catastrophic losses to fire. 
Researchers have achieved substantial consensus on the two most 
effective mitigation measures residents can take: structural mitigation 
and the creation of defensible space.43 Structural mitigation refers to 
building or retrofitting structures in the WUI with fire-resistant 
materials. Defensible space means keeping the immediate vicinity of 
structures free of all potential fuel sources and managing vegetation in 
the wider vicinity of structures to lessen burn intensity and keep 
structures from spontaneously combusting. This usually includes 
measures such as removing all vegetation from the immediate vicinity 
of structures, then thinning it within a wider perimeter—usually about 
one hundred feet, depending on the nature of the vegetation.44 
While there may be substantial scientific consensus on the 
effectiveness of these measures, the graduate research project alluded 
to above found that there is very little agreement across state lines on 
the question of whether state government should use its police powers 
to compel property owners to adopt these life- and property-saving 
wildfire mitigation practices.45 To analyze these variations, we 
categorized legal approaches to wildfire mitigation on non-public 
lands along two dimensions: form of authority and locus of authority. 
Form of authority refers to the “hard law/soft law” dimension—
that is, whether there are mandatory land use mitigation regulations in 
place, or if instead government only advise land owners on what 
measures they might take to reduce wildfire danger if they so choose. 
Locus of authority refers to the level of government from which either 
mandatory regulations or advisory assistance emanates (state, 
regional, or local). 
 
42 S.M STEIN ET. AL., supra note 16, at 1. 
43 See RUSSELL GRAHAM ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., FOREST SERV., FOURMILE 
CANYON FIRE FINDINGS 81 (2012), https://www.fs.fed.us/rm/pubs/rmrs_gtr289.pdf. 
(“Reducing wildfire home ignition potential is predicated on the home having ignition 
resistant materials and the homeowner removing flammable debris from on and around the 
house and maintaining this condition.”). 
44 Id. at 65, 80–81. 
45 See discussion infra Parts II.C.2, II.C.3. 
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By way of example, in our research, we discovered in California a 
common standard of WUI wildfire mitigation land use regulation, 
emanating from enactments by the state legislature.46 “Hard law” 
authority originated at the state government level, though it was also 
delegated to cooperating local governments and special purpose 
districts.47 In contrast, in states like Arizona, Colorado, and New 
Mexico, we found just the opposite—“soft law” at the state level and 
advisory in nature insofar as private land use regulation was 
concerned.48 However, local option states also empower local 
governments to implement mandatory wildfire mitigation property 
and land use regulations if they decide to use local police powers in 
this way.49 
1. Models of Wildfire Mitigation Regulation on Private Lands 
In assessing state laws through the lenses of form of authority and 
locus of authority, two distinct forms of WUI wildfire mitigation law 
and policy began to emerge. The first form is the common standard 
model. The name, “common standard” refers to the model’s two 
features. First, regardless of where in the WUI one lives in a common 
standard state, the general requirements for structural mitigation and 
defensible space maintenance are basically uniform.50 Second, 
regardless of what mountain town, unincorporated community, or 
rural open space one happens to live in, all residents hold in common 
the forest reserve they share. Wildland fires roam where they will, 
driven by heat, winds, and fuel. Residents inhabit a naturally-defined 
commons, and what one cohabitant of the common space or resources 
does or does not do by way of wildfire mitigation inevitably affects 
the well-being of all others who share the commons. 
However, the common standard model can also impose significant 
costs on WUI residents—both financial and in terms of personal 
freedoms. Additionally, common standard states place both 
affirmative requirements and land use restrictions on WUI 
 
46 See discussion infra Part II.C.2.a. 
47 See discussion infra Part II.C.2.a. 
48 See discussion infra Part II.C.3. 
49 See discussion infra Part II.C.3. 
50 Though in California, the degree of mitigation required is to some degree calibrated 
to the severity of wildfire risk. See infra Part II.C.2. 
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homeowners,51 who may have moved there in the first place largely to 
escape civilization and its trappings. 
The second form of authority is the local option model. In contrast 
to common standard states, local option states are those in which 
legislators have decided to leave it up to neighborhoods, fire districts, 
towns, and counties in the WUI to decide for themselves whether they 
want to impose the obligation to make their properties fire-safe in 
their own communities.52 These are the states most deferential to 
private property rights and the freedom of home owners to manage 
their estates as they wish.53 
In these states, homeowners associations, fire districts, and 
municipal and county governments decide for themselves whether or 
not to constrain their freedom to manage their properties as they wish 
in the interests of mitigating commonly-faced wildfire hazards.54 The 
freedom of those in the backcountry to live and manage their property 
as they choose appears to be a prime policy objective in the local 
option model, and the effects of their individual decisions on the rest 
of the forested area in which their property lies seems to be more of a 
secondary consideration. 
The common standard and local option models of WUI wildfire 
mitigation law-making are archetypes—generic models. Some states 
in our sample fit easily within these categories—others, not so much. 
Nevada and Utah, for example, fell into a third category of what 
might be called “hybrid states”—that is, they contain elements of both 
policy approaches.55 
However, the common standard and local option models do 
broadly reflect the competing policy narratives that brought them into 
being. The common standard states have enacted statewide mitigation 
policies that align with the idea that, since everyone in the WUI 
shares a common wildfire threat, everyone also bears some degree of 
responsibility for mitigating that threat.56 In the local option states, by 
contrast, local governments may impose a regulatory mitigation 
mandate on all property owners for common defense against 
 
51 See discussion infra Part II.C.2. 
52 See discussion infra Part II.C.3. 
53 See discussion infra Part II.C.3. 
54 See discussion infra Part II.C.3. 
55 See discussion infra Part II.C.4. 
56 See infra Part II.C.2. 
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wildfires.57 Among multiple town, county, or fire districts in the same 
forested area, some may have mandatory wildfire mitigation 
ordinances, while others do not58—a policy approach clearly more 
deferential to the private property rights of those living in 
jurisdictions without mandatory mitigation. 
2. Applying the Model (I): Common Standard States 
In our survey, the only two common standard states are California 
and Oregon. However, inasmuch as these statewide standards are also 
mandatory—and in California’s case, enforceable at multiple levels of 
government—they are perhaps the most impactful of all the state 
regimes because of the sheer number of WUI residents they cover. 
a. California 
By one estimate, about forty percent of the housing stock in 
California lies within its WUI—the highest percentage of any of the 
states in our survey.59 The California Department of Forestry and Fire 
Protection (CAL FIRE) is California’s leading emergency 
management and response authority for wildfires.60 Its mission is to 
serve and safeguard the people, property, and resources in the State of 
California.61 CAL FIRE is responsible for thirty-one million acres of 
California’s privately-owned wildlands (State Responsibility Areas 
(SRAs)).62 Additionally, CAL FIRE provides emergency services to 
thirty-six out of fifty-eight California counties.63 
The mission of the State Board of Forestry and Fire Protection is to 
develop policies and programs that serve the public interest.64 
Statutory responsibilities include establishing and administering forest 
and rangeland policy; protecting and representing California’s 
interests in forestry and rangeland issues; providing direction and 
 
57 See infra Part II.C.3. 
58 See infra Part II.C.3. 
59 Burton, supra note 23, at 17. 
60 CAL FIRE, What is CAL FIRE?, 1 (Dec. 2016), http://calfire.ca.gov/communications 
/downloads/fact_sheets/WhatisCALFIRE.pdf. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. For more information about State Responsibility Areas, see Fire Hazard Severity 
Zone Re-Mapping Project, CAL FIRE, http://frap.fire.ca.gov/projects/hazard/fhz.html (last 
visited Apr. 24, 2018). 
63 About Us, CAL FIRE, http://calfire.ca.gov/about/about (last visited Apr. 24, 2018). 
64 Fire Plan−2010 Strategic Fire Plan for California, CAL FIRE, http://osfm.fire 
.ca.gov/fireplan/fireplanning.php (last visited Apr. 24, 2018). 
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guidance to CAL FIRE regarding fire protection and resource 
management; accomplishing a regulatory program in fire protection; 
and conducting duties to inform and respond to the people of 
California.65 
California Public Resources Code sections 4114 and 4130 
authorize CAL FIRE to establish a fire plan.66 In order to facilitate the 
plan, the California Public Resources Code sections 4201 to 4204 and 
Government Code sections 51175 to 51189 mandate CAL FIRE to 
map areas (zones) of “significant fire hazard based on fuels, terrain, 
weather, and other relevant factors.”67 CAL FIRE creates the maps by 
utilizing Geographic Information System (GIS) data in conjunction 
with modeling techniques designed to describe potential fire behavior 
and fire probability.68 These zones are classified as Very High Fire 
Hazard Severity Zones (VHFHSZs).69 
The Office of the State Marshal (OSFM) coordinates with CAL 
FIRE to implement fire prevention programs and regulations.70 These 
programs include engineering, education, enforcement, and support, 
which include regulation of buildings, mapping, and data 
assessment.71 The OSFM wildfire mitigation regulations are directly 
applicable to all lands within the State Responsibility Area and 
enforceable by OSFM or its designees.72 
Incorporated communities (cities and towns) in the WUI and 
adjoining SRAs are strongly encouraged to incorporate by reference 
the OSFM’s wildfire mitigation regulations into their own land use 
regulation programs for wildfire mitigation.73 A community that 
 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Fire Hazard Severity Zone Remapping Project, CAL FIRE, http://frap.fire.ca.gov 
/projects/hazard/fhz.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2018); see also CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 
4201–4204 (West 2018); CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 51175–51189 (West 2018). 
68 CAL. BD. OF FORESTRY & FIRE PROT. & CAL. DEP’T OF FORESTRY & FIRE PROT., 
2010 STRATEGIC FIRE PLAN FOR CALIFORNIA 12 (June 2010), http://cdfdata 
.fire.ca.gov/pub/fireplan/fpupload/fpppdf668.pdf. 
69 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 51178 (West 2018). 
70 About Us, supra note 63. 
71 Fire Prevention, CAL FIRE, http://calfire.ca.gov/fire_prevention/fire_prevention (last 
visited Apr. 24, 2018). 
72 Wildfire Protection, CAL FIRE, http://osfm.fire.ca.gov/codedevelopment/wildfire 
protection (last visited Apr. 24, 2018); Wildfire Protection Building Construction, CAL 
FIRE, http://osfm.fire.ca.gov/codedevelopment/wildfireprotectionbuildingconstruction (last 
visited Apr. 24, 2018). 
73 See Wildfire Protection Building Construction, CAL FIRE, http://osfm.fire.ca.gov/co 
dedevelopment/wildfireprotectionbuildingconstruction (last visited Apr. 24, 2018). 
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wishes to develop its own mitigation regime carries the burden of 
proof that its approach is as effective as the OSFM’s at preserving 
lives and property.74 
California Government Code section 51183.5 requires sellers to 
accompany real property within a VHFHSZ with a natural hazard 
disclosure and a map informing the transferor and his or her agent that 
such property is located therein for a real property sale transaction.75 
Such disclosures are required of VHFHSZs, local responsibility areas, 
and wildland areas.76 Wildland areas with a higher severity of wildfire 
risk also require to disclosure that assistance will not be given in case 
of a fire unless CAL FIRE and the local authority have entered into a 
contract.77 
Several sections of the California Building Standards Code provide 
regulation for construction. Title 24 of the Building Code, which 
incorporates the California Fire Code, mandates requirements for new 
building construction, placing emphasis on defensible space, access, 
and water requirements.78 
Generally, CAL FIRE is responsible for overseeing wildfire 
prevention, education, and mitigation programs and proposals, while 
the OSFM is typically responsible for administration, regulation, and 
enforcement.79 Local government acts accordingly. Local building 
officials and fire authorities are responsible for enforcing California 
Building Code Chapter 7A standards.80 
In summation, California’s regulatory regime for mitigating against 
the loss of human life and property in the WUI is mandatory rather 
than advisory. Moreover, the locus of this mandatory authority is 
principally at the state level because local jurisdictions can mandate 
stricter mitigation standards if they wish to do so. 
 
74 Id. (“The Office of the State Fire Marshal (OSFM) is responsible for the 
development of minimum statewide building construction regulations that, when used in 
conjunction with hazardous vegetation management, will reduce statewide losses from 
disastrous wildfires. State and local government enforcement agencies are responsible for 
the application of these (or more restrictive) regulations when a building construction 
permit is issued.” (emphasis added)). 
75 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 51183.5 (West 2018) (effective Jan. 1, 2000). 
76 CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 4136 (West 2018) (effective Jan. 1, 2000). 
77 Id. § 4136(b). 
78 See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 24, §§ 503, 504, 507, 509, 4907 (2017). 
79 About Us, supra note 63. 
80 CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 4136(b). 
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b. Oregon 
The Oregon State Department of Forestry is established in Oregon 
as the agency responsible for risk management and wildfire 
management in the WUI.81 The Department of Forestry relies on 
county-appointed forestland-urban interface classification committees 
to define the areas that make up the forestland-urban interface, or 
WUI.82 “Once lands have been determined to meet the definition of 
forestland, they are further classified as lands primarily suitable for 
timber production, grazing use, or a combination of the two.”83 
According to Oregon law, the home county of the council is 
responsible for initial funding of the committee; however, the State 
Forestry Department can be made responsible for a portion or all of 
the costs of the county-level WUI mapping committee by written 
agreement.84 
State law mandates that individuals living in high-risk areas 
mitigate fire danger on their property or face fines.85 Administrative 
regulations implementing this law describe the specific measures that 
landowners must take.86 While these measures are generally 
mandatory,87 a non-conflict clause in the ORS allows certain WUI 
landowners to avoid compliance.88 State law does not, however, 
empower or delegate enforcement power to local governments in the 
case of WUI wildfire mitigation.89 
Oregon state law specifically empowers the Department of 
Forestry to enforce mitigation land use regulations against non-
compliant local governments.90 State statute mandates that the State 
Forester classify county lands according to the administrative rules if 
a county fails to comply with state mapping requirements.91 However, 
 
81 OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 477.005 (West 2018). 
82 Id. §§ 477.029, .031. 
83 Forestland Classification, OR. DEP’T OF FORESTRY, http://oregon.gov/ODF/fire 
/pages/forestlandclassification.aspx (2018). 
84 OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 477.029(3) (West 2018). 
85 Id. § 477.059(1)(a), (6). 
86 OR. ADMIN. R. 629-044-1055 to -1075 (2002). 
87 OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 477.059(1)(c) (West 2018). 
88 Id. § 477.023(2). 
89 See id. §§ 477.001–.993 (while local governments can make land designations, there 
is no statute that delegates enforcement power to local governments). 
90 Id. § 477.057(1). 
91 Id. 
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because the state is ultimately responsible for mapping WUI areas of 
concern,92 there is no apparent need to duplicate enforcement efforts. 
As compared with other states, then, Oregon’s regulatory regime 
looks a good deal more like California’s than it does those of the 
southwestern states. The major exception is that local governments in 
California have more authority to enforce WUI wildfire mitigation 
measures against non-compliant property owners, so long as they are 
acting under the color of state law. 
3. Applying the Model (II): Local Option States 
a. Arizona 
Arizona law empowers cities and towns to adopt a wildland-urban 
interface code, but does not require one.93 Such codes “may be 
adapted from a model code adopted by a national or international 
organization or association for mitigating the hazard to life and 
property.”94 There is no statewide WUI code that requires property 
owners to take mitigation actions.95 
The Arizona State Land Commissioner is directed to “[m]ake long-
range plans for the future use of state lands in cooperation with other 
state agencies, local planning authorities and political subdivisions.”96 
Arizona law authorizes the commissioner to designate land as “under 
consideration for classification as urban land[] suitable for urban 
planning, or suitable for conservation purposes if the lands are to be 
planned in conjunction with lands to be developed.”97 Neither of these 
statutes regarding land use planning specifically address the WUI.98 
In sum, state WUI wildfire mitigation law is advisory in form as it 
relates to property owner structural and defensible space mitigation, 
though it authorizes local communities to adopt mandatory 
regulations should they choose to do so. 
 
92 See id. §§ 477.027–.057 (leaving mapping criteria to the State Board of Forestry, 
actual mapping of areas to local classification committees, and if the classification 
committees fails to map, the State Forester). 
93 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-806(A) (West 2017). 
94 Id. 
95 See id. (Code does not require individuals to take action: “[a] city or town may adopt 
a current wildland-urban interface code.” (emphasis added)). 
96 Id. § 37-132(A)(3). 
97 Id. § 37-332(A). 
98 See id. §§ 37-132, -332 (making no reference of a wildland urban interface). 
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b. Colorado 
The Colorado statutory framework is more like Arizona’s than it is 
California’s—it rests solidly in the local option category. Specifically, 
there is no state law mandating that property owners in the WUI 
engage in proactive wildfire mitigation practices.99 Instead, like 
Arizona, Colorado state law authorizes city and county governments 
to engage in general land use planning and regulation.100 
Similar to Arizona, this has resulted in a complex patchwork of 
advisory and mandatory local land use regulations throughout the 
state’s various “red zones” or WUIs.101 In the aftermath of the 
catastrophic wildfires beginning in the twenty-first century, some city 
and county governments in Colorado’s WUI have imposed rigorous 
wildfire mitigation regulations, while others have done little or 
nothing.102 In fact, facing pressure from real estate dealers and 
property owners, one mountain town, Breckenridge, actually 
rescinded its mandatory defensible space ordinance in 2009.103 
Local governments and utilities can enact substantial public control 
measures (e.g., mechanical thinning or prescribed burns) to mitigate 
against catastrophic wildfires on their lands.104 Additionally, like all 
other states in this survey, Colorado has enacted state laws to make 
possible the receipt of wildfire mitigation funding under the federal 
Healthy Forest Restoration Act of 2003.105 
In 2012 and 2013, the wildfire season in Colorado was the one of 
the most deadly and destructive the state had ever seen.106 In the midst 
of the fire season, the Colorado legislature enacted several reforms 
 
99 See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-33.5-710 (West 2018) (making no reference of 
wildand urban interface requirements for mitigation). 
100 Id. § 24-33.5-710. 
101 See Ryan Maye Handy, Despite Two Catastrophic Wildfires, El Paso County 
Officials Refuse to Pass More Stringent Fire Codes for Building, COLO. SPRINGS 
GAZETTE (July 24, 2015), http://gazette.com/despite-two-catastrophic-wildfires-el-paso     
-county-officials-refuse-to-pass-more-stringent-fire-codes-for-building/article/1556233 
(“Unlike the city of Colorado Springs, which heavily regulates building in wildfire zones, 
the county has no universal fire code standard. Instead, it has a patchwork of fire codes 
and land use regulations that vary between more than 26 fire districts.”). 
102 Id. 
103 Bruce Finley, Breckenridge’s Wildfire-Safety Law Rescinded, DENVER POST (July 
31, 2009, 2:56 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_12970233. 
104 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-20-105.5(5)(a) (West 2018). 
105 Id. § 30-15-401.7. 
106 Kevin Hamm, Colorado wildfires, major fires from 1971-2013: Interactive graphic, 
THE DENVER POST (June 7, 2014, 3:41 PM), https://www.denverpost.com/2014 
/06/07/colorado-wildfires-major-fires-from-1971-2013-interactive-graphic/. 
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and reorganized the executive branch agencies responsible for 
mapping, planning, coordinating mitigation efforts, and responding to 
wildfires in the WUI.107 Several of these functions formerly carried 
out by the State Forest Service are now performed by the newly 
created Division of Fire Prevention and Control.108 However, 
mandatory WUI wildfire mitigation regulation continues to remain 
exclusively a matter of local government control.109 
c. New Mexico 
The New Mexico State Forestry Division has lead agency authority 
for preventing wildfires and helping WUI residents develop wildfire 
preparedness plans.110 A Fire Planning Task Force works to develop 
fire prevention plans for use by local governments throughout the 
state.111 This task force is also responsible for reviewing community 
and county “Community Wildfire Protection Plans,” which 
communities in the WUI may opt to develop with federal assistance 
under the 2003 Healthy Forests Initiative.112 
Though New Mexico law does not mandate individual property 
owner wildfire mitigation, New Mexico’s police power does extend to 
the control of private forests lands as needed for forest fire prevention 
and protection.113 The State Forester is authorized to enter private 
lands and investigate violations of the law, rules, and regulations 
related to forest fire prevention.114 The Forester has the appropriate 
police powers to apprehend and arrest on warrant any violators. 
While these provisions apply to all private landowners, insofar as 
residents are residing on forestland, the New Mexico State Forestry 
advises homeowners to use wildfire mitigation practices, but does not 
 
107 See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-33.5-1201(1) (West 2018); H.B. 12-1283, 68th 
Gen. Assemb. (Colo. 2012). 
108 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-33.5-1201(4)(b)(I) (transferring all jobs related to 
wildfire treatment from the forest service to the division of fire prevention). 
109 See id. § 24-33.5 (within Article 33.5 there are no provisions mandating state 
enforcement or control). 
110 See Fire Prevention and Outreach, N.M. STATE FORESTRY, http://www.emnrd 
.state.nm.us/SFD/FireMgt/FirePreventionandOutreachProgram.html (last visited Apr. 24, 
2018). 
111 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 68-2-34 (West 2018). 
112 Community Wildfire Protection Plans, N.M. STATE FORESTRY, http://www.emnrd 
.state.nm.us/SFD/FireMgt/cwpps.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2018). 
113 N.M. CONST. art. XV, § 2. 
114 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 68-2-14 (West 2018). 
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mandate their adoption.115 Local governments may require the 
adoption of fire prevention plans under the Healthy Forest Restoration 
Act if they so choose.116 
4. Applying the Model (III): Hybrid States 
Both Nevada and Utah fall into the category of hybrid states, but 
for different reasons. In Utah, the models are combined due purely to 
legislative intent. In Nevada, the categorization is not only due to 
legislative intent, but also the fact that there are national or interstate 
recreation areas spanning Nevada’s borders with Arizona and 
California. Arizona and Nevada share a border on the Lake Mead 
National Recreation Area, and California and Nevada share a border 
on Lake Tahoe and fall under the jurisdiction of the congressionally 
authorized Lake Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA).117 
a. Nevada 
The Nevada Division of Forestry, through the State Forester 
Firewarden,118 and the Nevada Department of Public Safety, through 
the State Fire Marshal, are the state agencies empowered to handle 
most aspects of wildfire prevention, protection and suppression in 
Nevada.119 These agencies recommend but do not mandate mitigation 
standards, leaving local jurisdictions to decide how assertively they 
 
115 See Fire Prevention and Outreach, N.M. STATE FORESTRY, supra note 110. 
(Providing links to “fire safety planning for your home” and “fire prevention tips,” but 
mentioning no mandatory mitigation practices). 
116 Alexander Evans et al., Evaluating the Effectiveness of Wildfire Mitigation Activities 
in the Wildland-Urban Interface, FOREST STEWARDS GUILD 10 (2015), http://www.forest 
guild.org/publications/research/2015/WUI_effectiveness.pdf (“a CWPP is defined as a 
plan . . . developed within the context of the collaborative agreements and the guidance 
established by the Wildland Fire Leadership Council and agreed to by the applicable local 
government . . . in the vicinity of the at-risk community.”). 
117 See About TRPA, TAHOE REGIONAL PLAN. AGENCY, http://www.trpa.org/about-tr 
pa (last visited Apr. 24, 2018); Act of Dec. 19, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-551, 94 Stat. 3233 
(1980) (TRPA is an interstate planning authority authorized by Congress for the 
preservation and sustainable management of the Lake Tahoe Basin). 
118 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 232.120(1) (West 2017). 
119 Fire Prevention, DEPT. OF PUBLIC SAFETY STATE FIRE MARSHAL, http://fire.nv.gov 
/bureaus/FPL/Fire_Prevention (last visited Apr. 24, 2018); Wildland Fire Protection 
Program, NEV. DIV. OF FORESTRY, http://forestry.nv.gov/fire-program (last visited Apr. 
24, 2018). 
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wish to focus on wildfire safety.120 In this regard, Nevada has much in 
common with the local option states. 
The Nevada State Forester Firewarden is authorized to designate 
fire hazardous forested areas.121 The Firewarden is required to 
regulate roofing materials and may also regulate vegetation 
surrounding structures.122 The State Fire Marshal, through 
incorporation of the International Wildland-Urban Interface Code 
(2009), also plays a role in land use planning.123 Thus, together, the 
State Forester Firewarden and the State Fire Marshal are responsible 
for risk management and wildfire disaster management in the WUI. 
Nevada residents can also form various types of fire protection 
districts subject to approval by the State Forester Firewarden.124 In 
these fire protection districts, the State Forester Firewarden may 
regulate vegetation surrounding structures.125 Additionally, each 
county in Nevada has a Community Wildfire Protection Plan that lays 
out hazards and conducts risk assessments for local communities.126 
The State Fire Marshal, through incorporation of the International 
Wildland-Urban Interface Code (2012), plays an important role in 
land use regulation in the WUI.127 Additionally, the Nevada State 
Forester Firewarden also plays a role in land use regulation in the 
WUI. The State Forester Firewarden is required to regulate roofing 
materials in fire hazardous areas.128 Enforcement of roofing materials 
regulations is split between the state and local agencies. In areas 
where building codes exist, enforcement of roofing material 
regulations is under control of the local governments.129 
 
120 See Hazardous Fuels/Fuel Reduction, NEV. DIVISION OF FORESTRY, http://forestry 
.nv.gov/fire-program/hazardous-fuels-reduction (last visited Apr. 24, 2018) (listing things 
homeowners can or should do, not must do). 
121 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 472.040(1)(d) (West 2017). 
122 Id. §§ 472.040(1)(e), .041. 
123 NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 477.281(1)(c) (2015). 
124 See generally NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 474 (West 2017). 
125 Id. § 472.041. 
126 Wildfire Risk Assessment & Community Protection, NEV. DIV. OF FORESTRY, 
http://forestry.nv.gov/fire-program/wildfire-risk-assessment-protection/ (last visited Mar. 
19, 2018). Cf. Wildland Fire Protection Program, supra note 119 (“The Nevada Division 
of Forestry provides wildfire protection statewide through its Wildland Fire Protection 
Program, which was approved by the Nevada State Legislature in 2013.”). 
127 NEV. ADMIN. CODE 477.281(1)(c) (2015). 
128 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 472.040(1)(e) (West 2017); NEV. ADMIN. CODE 472.020, 
.030 (2016). 
129 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 472.100(2) (West 2017). 
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In areas with no building codes, enforcement lies with the State 
Forester Firewarden.130 The State Forester Firewarden also may 
regulate vegetation around structures in fire hazardous areas and in 
fire protection districts, and is authorized to enforce any such enacted 
regulations.131 When no other fire agency has authority, the State 
Forester Firewarden is responsible for assessing any codes adopted by 
other agencies in these regions to ensure consistency in fire safety 
codes.132 
However, land use in two large regions of Nevada—the Lake 
Meade National Recreation Area and lands subject to the jurisdiction 
of TRPA—is governed by multi-state regional compacts.133 By 
interstate agreement (with Arizona and California in the Lake Mead 
case, and with California at Lake Tahoe) and congressional 
imprimatur, all properties within these regions are subject to 
mandatory WUI wildfire mitigation standards.134 These regions 
adhere to the common standard approach of wildfire mitigation. In 
June of 2007, the Angora Fire swept through pine-shaded 
communities south of Lake Tahoe, destroying over 250 homes135 to 
the tune of more than $140 million in lost property value.136 Now the 
mitigation standards and enforcement protocols promulgated by the 
California State Fire Marshal prevail over community covenants 
throughout the region.137 
In the Lake Tahoe and Lake Mead regions, the Nevada State 
Forester Firewarden and the Nevada State Fire Marshal work together 
to regulate fire retardant roofing and vegetation near structures, 
though the specifics of these regulations are not in state law.138 The 
TRPA provides specific regulations for certain activities within the 
region, such as home construction and modifications, in its Code of 
 
130 Id. § 472.100(3). 
131 See id. § 472.040(1)(i). 
132 Id. § 472.040(1)(j). 
133 See About TRPA, supra note 117; About Us, LAS VEGAS INTERAGENCY 
COMMUNICATION CENTER, http://lvinteragency.org/aboutus.shtml (last visited Apr. 21, 
2018). 
134 Burton, supra note 23, at 28. 
135 Angora Fire Incident Information, CAL FIRE, http://cdfdata.fire.ca.gov/incidents 
/incidents_details_info?incident_id=184 (last updated Oct. 31, 2017). 
136 Kellene Stockwell, Angora Fire Destroys $141 Million in Real Estate, KTVN (June 
27, 2007), http://www.ktvn.com/story/6717603/angora-fire-destroys-141-million-in-real    
-estate. 
137 See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 472.040(1)(i) (West 2017). 
138 Id. §§ 472.040(1)(i), 477.030(3). 
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Ordinances.139 Plans are submitted to TRPA, which are approved at 
TRPA’s discretion.140 
In areas not governed by regional compacts, the Nevada State 
Forester Firewarden may direct landowners to remove hazards, as 
well as eliminate hazards and recover costs of such elimination from 
the landowner.141 Fire protection districts have the same authority 
regarding hazards.142 By contrast, in the Lake Tahoe and Lake Mead 
regions, the State Firewarden and the State Fire Marshal are together 
tasked with enforcement of all laws regarding management of 
vegetation.143 Thus, the Nevada regulatory regime represents 
something of a hybrid, relative to the case studies already covered. 
Similar to California, the State Forester Firewarden and State Fire 
Marshal both exercise a good deal more direct regulatory authority 
over local land use wildfire mitigation practices. Also like California, 
local jurisdictions may regulate under their own police powers so long 
as mitigation standards are no weaker than those set by the state. 
Additionally, in the areas of Nevada and California that are subject to 
interstate regional land use agreements, preemptive state authority is 
even more pronounced than it is in typical common standard states. 
b. Utah 
The Utah Division of Forestry, Fire, and State Lands maps out the 
“red zone” and the degree of risk in the WUI.144 The Forestry, Fire, 
and State Land Advisory Council offers guidance on land use to the 
Division of Forestry, Fire, and State Lands. The Division also offers a 
website that advises communities on risks and mitigation 
techniques.145 
 
139 See generally TAHOE REGIONAL PLANNING AGENCY, CODE OF ORDINANCES 
(effective Feb. 9, 2013), http://www.trpa.org/wp-content/uploads/TRPA-Code-of-Ordi 
nances_December17.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. FOREST SERV. ET. AL., Lake Tahoe Basin 
Multi-Jurisdictional Fuel Reduction and Wildfire Prevention Strategy 44–51 (2007), 
https://scholarsbank.uoregon.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1794/17742/NV_510_Lake 
TahoeBasin_2007.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. 
140 See generally Act of Dec. 19, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-551(II)(g), 94 Stat. 3233, at Art. 
VI (1980). 
141 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 472.500 (West 2017) (formerly cited as NEV. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 472.120). 
142 Id. § 474.580(1). 
143 Id. § 477.030(3). 
144 UTAH ADMIN. CODE § 652-122-400 (2017). 
145 Wildfire Risk Assessment Portal, UTAH DEP’T OF NAT. RESOURCES, https://utahwild 
firerisk.utah.gov/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2018). 
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To receive financial and supervisory cooperation and assistance 
from the Division, county legislative groups must enter into a 
cooperative agreement with the Division.146 A county can only qualify 
to enter into a cooperative agreement if it agrees to: (1) adopt a 
wildland fire ordinance based upon minimum standards established 
by the Division; and (2) require that the county fire department or 
equivalent private provider under contract with the county meet 
minimum standards for wildland fire training, certification, and 
wildland fire suppression equipment based upon nationally accepted 
standards as specified by the Division.147 A county that chooses not to 
enter into a cooperative agreement with the Division will not be 
eligible to receive financial assistance from the division.148 State law 
further encourages county sheriffs to submit reports on wildland fire 
control action, investigate and report fire causes, and enforce the 
provisions of section 65A, either independently or in coordination 
with the state forester.149 
Additionally, counties not directly participating in the state wildfire 
mitigation program “shall abate the public nuisance caused by 
wildfire on unincorporated, privately owned or county owned forest, 
range, watershed, and wildland urban interface lands within its 
boundaries.”150 Therefore, state law does not mandate homeowner 
WUI wildfire mitigation; however, it does authorize counties to 
mitigate the land within their county as needed and compel individual 
homeowners to do so. Thus, the Division of Forestry is empowered to 
pursue a carrot and stick approach in working with local governments 
to adopt wildfire mitigation measures: “[t]he division shall bill a 
county that is not covered by a cooperative agreement with the 
division, as described in Section 65A-8-203, for the cost of wildfire 
suppression within the jurisdiction of that county accrued by the 
state.”151 
Though the statute does not require local government compliance 
with state standards, it does place an affirmative duty on county 
governments to abate wildfire risk on both privately owned and local 
government-owned properties within county jurisdictions.152 
 
146 UTAH CODE ANN. § 65A-8-203(3)(a) (West 2017). 
147 Id. § 65A-8-203(4). 
148 Id. § 65A-8-203(3)(a). 
149 Id. § 65A-8-209. 
150 Id. § 65A-8-202(1). 
151 Id. § 65A-8-203.2. 
152 Id. § 65A-8-202(1). 
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Ultimately, this places the onus on local governments to demonstrate 
why they have declined to adopt the WUI Code, creating potential 
legal liability for not having done so. Utah is a hybrid state precisely 
due to this combination of state and local regulation and enforcement. 
III 
CONTESTED LANDS AND COMPETING POLICY NARRATIVES (II): 
WILDFIRE MANAGEMENT 
A. Narrative I: Wars and Rumors of Wars 
In her 2011 article, Disaster Mythology and the Law, Lisa Grow 
Sun made compelling connections between disaster narratives—the 
stories we tell ourselves about why disasters happen and what we 
ought to do about them—and the policies we adopt that are reflective 
of those narratives.153 She demonstrated how the most pervasive of 
these myths, the metaphor of war, results in disaster response policies 
and practices that prioritize law enforcement over humanitarian aid.154 
She cites the example of hysterical media accounts of uncontrolled 
rape and pillage in the streets of New Orleans, which were later 
proved to be unfounded and had to be retracted.155 
In the same vein, Justin Pidot provided a detailed accounting of 
how the ubiquitous metaphor of natural disaster response as military 
conflict has resulted in both the public and policy makers coming to 
understand ourselves as being in a perpetual war with nature.156 We 
are under relentless attack from the sea (hurricanes), from the sky 
(torrential storms and tornadoes), and from the very Earth itself 
(wildfires and earthquakes).157 He offers multiple well-documented 
examples of how political and disaster response leaders use the 
language of warfare to characterize the threats we face and the need to 
respond accordingly—aided, abetted, and sometimes egged on by 
news media coverage that relies exclusively on the trope of war.158 
 
153 Lisa Grow Sun, Disaster Mythology and the Law, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1131, 1135–
36 (2011). 
154 Id. 
155 Id. at 1141–43. 
156 Justin Pidot, Symbolic, Cognitive, and Structural Obstacles to Formulating Disaster 
Policy, in 68 STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS, & SOC’Y, SPECIAL ISSUE CASSANDRA’S CURSE: 
THE LAW AND FORESEEABLE FUTURE DISASTERS 33, 35–41 (Lloyd Burton & Lisa Grow 
Sun special issue eds., Austin Sarat series ed., 2015). 
157 Id. 
158 Id. at 36–41. 
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Over a century ago, the founding chief of the United States Forest 
Service, Gifford Pinchot, found it to be in his agency’s best interest 
politically to characterize wildfire in our national forests as an 
implacable foe that must be eradicated at all costs.159 Established in 
1905 under the conservationist President Theodore Roosevelt, the 
young agency was in danger of being dismantled by hostile western 
senators and their extractive industry supporters, until the largest 
forest fire in recorded American history destroyed over three million 
acres of Idaho and Montana mountain forests, and the small towns 
within them, in the summer of 1910.160 
Pinchot promised that if Congress doubled his agency’s budget, he 
could make such massive fires a thing of the past in the national 
forest, thus preserving timber for harvest and intact watersheds to 
serve thirsty communities.161 Thus, the USFS became western states’ 
de facto backcountry national fire department.162 In the name of 
protecting the forests for timber production, the service successfully 
suppressed most big fires for over half a century.163 In the post-World 
War II era, the use of military surplus vehicles, aircraft, logistical 
infrastructure, and personal gear further enhanced the image of the 
Forest Service as an army deployed to protect our forests and the 
communities within them from impending attack.164 
The war narrative is just as salient and persuasive today as it was at 
the Forest Service’s inception. In his book Megafire, Michael Kodas 
devotes an entire chapter to what he calls the “fire-industrial 
complex.”165 It operates in much the same way as its namesake, the 
military-industrial complex. The public and policy makers are first 
frightened into believing that an imminent threat exists—one that can 
be effectively countered only by deploying the kinds of military-style 
hardware and response tactics that shield us from other forms of 
national security threats.166 Then, the policies are set, the 
appropriations for assault technology are acquired, and the ongoing 
 
159 TIMOTHY EGAN, THE BIG BURN 50–52 (2009). 
160 Id. at 68–69, 89–100, 172–73, 246–48. 
161 Id. at 239–48. 
162 Id. at 269–72. 
163 Id. 
164 STEPHEN J. PYNE, TENDING FIRE 56–58 (2004). 
165 KODAS, supra note 17, at 136–44. 
166 Id. at 140–44. 
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assault against the relentless destructive forces of nature is 
escalated.167 
One telling example Kodas provides of the fire-industrial complex 
is how the Colorado Legislature was induced to invest $20 million in 
the state’s own fleet of firefighting aircraft, even as it refused to enact 
much lower cost legislation that would have done a better job of 
saving lives and property, (e.g., mapping red zones, predicting 
wildfire outbreaks, compelling sellers of real estate in the high 
country to inform buyers of wildfire risk, and imposing statewide 
wildfire mitigation standards), as is done in common standard states 
such as California.168 Colorado State Senator Steve King, an advocate 
for the state wildfire air corps legislation, worked with a lobbyist who 
he instructed on  how to work with legislators on this bill: “your job is 
to scare the hell out of them.”169 Evidently, he succeeded. 
B. Narrative II: Reconciliation 
The narrative described above is a grim and forbidding one. We are 
engaged in an ongoing and unending civil war with our own 
environment. Whether battling encroaching sea levels on our coasts or 
the fire menace in the Mountain West, both of which continue to 
grow in size, scope, and intensity as a result of climate change.170 The 
parallels with the dubious battles our nation fought over the last half 
century on the Korean Peninsula, Indochina, and the Middle East are 
hard to ignore. However, at least since the 1970s, a counter-narrative 
to the fire industrial complex has been coming into focus. For the 
purposes of this Article, I refer to it as the narrative of Reconciliation. 
I argue that this narrative appears in ever more detail, scientific 
validity, practicality, and cost-effectiveness than the fire industrial 
complex. The term “reconciliation” has two connotations, both of 
which apply here. 
The first is reconciliation after conflict. For example, when the 
apartheid regime in South Africa lost all moral legitimacy as well as 
political support, Archbishop Desmond Tutu realized that the most 
 
167 Id. 
168 See discussion of cost-effective mitigation options supra § II.C.2.a of this Article. 
As a local option state, Colorado has adopted none of these measures. 
169 KODAS, supra note 17, at 311–12. 
170 U.S. GLOB. CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE 
UNITED STATES: THE THIRD NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT 31–45 (Jerry M. Melillo 
et al. eds., 2014). 
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effective step toward healing his divided nation was not punitive 
political trials, but a process by which all sides could find a way to 
live peaceably together going forward.171 It was a civil and 
conciliatory end to what had been rapidly degenerating into a civil 
war.172 In bridging the post-apartheid South African experience to the 
environment, the reconciliation after conflict connotation embodies a 
cry to stop making war on our environment. It calls for us to begin 
making peace with and taking actions that respect our environment 
impersonal and inexorable natural processes. 
The second connotation is reconciling oneself to the facts of one’s 
situation; it is facing some undeniable, if inconvenient, truths and 
learning to live with them. That certainly applies to the case of 
wildfires in the Mountain West. Scientists predict a 200% to 400% 
increase in the amount of western forest acreage lost to wildfire by the 
mid-twenty-first century, owing principally to the effects of climate 
change.173 Every year, the fire season grows longer than the year 
before.174 It is now to the point where some regions of the West may 
no longer have a fire season because there is no season of the year in 
which there is not wildfire. 
Reconciliation calls upon us to stop living in denial of the fact that 
the WUI wildfire threat will only worsen over time. It calls upon us to 
realize that the more deeply we extend residential land conversion 
into our most flammable forests, the greater the resulting loss of life 
and property will be, and the greater the threat to WLFFs sent in to 
battle the inevitable conflagration. It calls upon us to finally recognize 
that, in the language of the fire-industrial complex narrative, we are 
fighting a war we will never win. The only true winners in such 
misconceived and mischaracterized situations are the war profiteers. 
Another form of the reconciliation narrative that has developed 
over the past fifty years among silviculturists and forest ecologists is 
based on scientific research telling us that fire is, and always has 
 
171 Tutu and His Role in the Truth & Reconciliation Commission, S. AFR. HISTORY 
ONLINE, http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/tutu-and-his-role-truth-reconciliation-commis 
sion (last updated Oct. 6, 2016). 
172 Id. 
173 RACHEL CLEETUS & KRANTI MULIK, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, PLAYING 
WITH FIRE: HOW CLIMATE CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT PATTERNS ARE CONTRIBUTING 
TO THE SOARING COSTS OF WESTERN WILDFIRES 6 (2014). 
174 A.L. Westerling et al., Warming and Earlier Spring Increase Western U.S. Forest 
Wildfire Activity, 313 SCI. 940, 943 (Aug.18, 2006). 
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been, essential to the health of the forests of the Mountain West.175 
Those of us who grew up or recreated in the Mountain West have 
experienced it as relatively fire-free and smoke-free, and assumed that 
this was the natural order of things. Now we are learning that we were 
raised and relaxing in a highly artificial, epistemic bubble—a Disney-
like fantasy world in which fire, at least for a while, was magically 
extirpated. 
But there was nothing magical about it. In fact, it was the fire 
industrial complex narrative at work, keeping at bay the fires that, 
though they would smudge the sky and perhaps deprive us of our 
favorite recreation sites, would also ensure the health and 
sustainability of those forests for generations to come. Reconciliation 
means fully accepting fire’s rightful role in maintaining the health and 
well-being of our forested lands. It means working in partnership with 
natural forces to let fire play its necessary role in sustaining the 
forests, while also bounding its power to threaten human 
communities’ health and well-being. The WUI then becomes less a 
war zone than a demilitarized zone. Peace keeping in this 
demilitarized zone means intensive replication of natural forces, 
whether through mechanical thinning or prescribed burns, to create a 
wide swath of wildfire-mitigated landscapes around areas of 
concentrated human habitation. 
Replicating natural forces in wildfire management on public lands 
gradually became more the norm rather than the exception in the 
latter years of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first,176 but 
the battle between the competing narratives rages on.177 
Reconciliation and replication are found in legislative measures such 
as the Healthy Forests Restoration Act, and the partnerships it 
encouraged between federal land managers and communities abutting 
public lands. However, no policy is worth the paper it is written on 
unless accompanied by the funds to implement it. Sadly, because of 
budget constraints, with every passing year federal land managers are 
reluctantly diverting funds from efforts to reconcile with nature to 
 
175 See, e.g., Charles F. Cooper, The Ecology of Fire, 204 SCI. AM. 150 (Apr. 1961). 
176 See KODAS, supra note 17, at 136−44. 
177 See discussion supra Part II.B.–C. 
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making war on fire.178 In essence, one narrative is being cannibalized 
to feed the other. 
IV 
IN THE CROSSFIRE: THE PERILOUS STANDING OF WILDLAND 
FIREFIGHTERS 
A. The Combat Zone 
WLFFs face two kinds of endangerment: the geographic setting in 
which they are working, and the competing narratives informing the 
policies and practices that govern how they fulfill their mission. 
Geographically, in the last twenty-five years, the two largest and most 
catastrophic fatal burnovers of WLFFs both happened in the WUI; 
and they both happened in states that had, and continue to have, no 
statewide mandatory wildfire mitigation regulations. 
The first was the Storm King (also known as South Mountain) 
burnover of fourteen WLFFs, some from the Prineville, Oregon 
hotshot crew, in western Colorado in 1994.179 They were working to 
contain a fire on steep slopes of scrub oak and chaparral near the town 
of Glenwood Springs, when a change in weather patterns blew up a 
smaller fire below them, drove it upslope, and immolated them.180 
The second was the infamous Yarnell Hill fire of the summer of 
2013 in central Arizona near the town of Prescott.181 The Granite 
Mountain Hotshots, the only federally certified hotshot team hosted 
by a municipal fire department, lost their lives trying to defend the 
nearby towns of Peeples Valley and Yarnell.182 The towns had taken 
no meaningful steps to mitigate their individual properties or their 
communities against wildfire danger.183 
 
178 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t. of Agric., USDA, DOI, and OMB Urge Congress to 
Fix the Fire Budget (Sept. 15, 2015), https://www.usda.gov/media/press-releases/2015 
/09/15/usda-doi-and-omb-urge-congress-fix-fire-budget. 
179 JOHN MACLEAN, FIRE ON THE MOUNTAIN: THE TRUE STORY OF THE SOUTH 
CANYON FIRE 64 (1999). 
180 Id. at 154. 
181 Kyle Dickman, 19: The True Story of the Yarnell Hill Fire, OUTSIDE MAG. (Sept. 
17, 2013), https://www.outsideonline.com/1926426/19-true-story-yarnell-hill-fire. 
182 Id. 
183 Crystal A. Kolden, Arizona fire deaths show no one should die for a house, WASH. 
POST (July 5, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/arizona-fire-deaths-show  
-no-one-should-die-for-a-house/2013/07/05/1c14eaf2-e343-11e2-aef3-339619eab080 
_story.html?utm_term=.fee92467710f. 
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The WLFFs who lost their lives at Storm King in Colorado were 
well away from Glenwood Springs, Colorado, but they were fighting 
that fire to keep it from moving towards Glenwood Springs.184 In the 
Yarnell Hill fire, the hotshot crew stepped into a safety zone when the 
fire they were working on swelled to a size that required much more 
equipment and many more WLLFs to contain.185 Regardless, they 
redeployed in an effort to make it to Yarnell to render some assistance 
in saving the town.186 Before they reached Yarnell, the fire roared up 
into the canyon they were descending, and they all perished, save for 
the crew’s lookout.187 
The other factor that makes the WUI a particularly deadly 
environment for WLFFs is organizational culture clash brought on by 
the fact that WLFFs from different agencies and different levels of 
government may be fighting the same fire for different reasons, and 
following different protocols. For instance, WLFFs deployed by 
federal land management agencies are not officially designated as 
firefighters but as forest resource technicians.188 The reason is that 
they are trained to use fire as a management tool.189 Fire suppression 
is one of the management techniques WLFFs use when lives or 
structures are threatened. Otherwise, they practice reconciliation: 
curbing and corralling a fire to do its work of forest scouring and 
rejuvenation.190 Big fires in the back country are often not 
extinguished through human intervention; they either burn out of their 
own accord or are doused by autumn or winter precipitation.191 On the 
other hand, WLFFs in the WUI employed by municipal, county 
jurisdictions, or rural fire districts have only one mission: immediate 
and total fire suppression.192 Their sole mission is to save lives and 
 
184 MACLEAN, supra note 179, at 7. 
185 Dickman, supra note 181. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. 
188 Becoming a Forestry Technician in Fire Suppression, GAME WARDEN, https://www 
.gamewarden.org/career/forestry-technician (last visited Apr. 24, 2018). 
189 Id. 
190 Id. 
191 Bobbi Nodell, Wildfires–Nature Taking Its Course?, NBC NEWS, http://www.nbc 
news.com/id/3080972/ns/weather/t/wildfires-nature-taking-its-course/#.WoDtbGbMzR0 
(last visited Apr. 24, 2018). 
192 All Hazard Response, ARIZ. DEP’T. OF FORESTRY AND FIRE MGMT., https://dffm.az 
.gov/all-hazard-response (last visited Apr. 24, 2018) (stating that Arizona’s “All Hazard 
IMT’s primary goals will always be the protection of the public, the emergency  
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protect property.193 Fire as a resource management tool is not part of 
their job description.194 
What is happening in these situations is organizational mission 
divergence. In an urban fire department, the mission is always 
immediate and total suppression of any fire as soon as it is 
discovered, because the effects of not doing so are catastrophic. 
Urban areas are densely populated and uncontrolled fire could quickly 
take dozens of lives and cause millions of dollars in property damage. 
The firefighters who attack them are heavily armored with thick 
fireproof clothing, self-contained breathing apparatuses, and an array 
of firefighting technologies at hand and on their vehicles.195 Urban 
firefighters are occasionally called upon to risk their lives to save 
lives, as well as minimize the loss of property. Aggressive and 
unrelenting attack on any fire anywhere is their reason for existence. 
Urban firefighters are structural firefighters. The techniques they 
use to save structures and the technologies they use to do so are 
categorically different from the clothing, technologies, and techniques 
used by WLFFs, whether they are employed by federal, state, or local 
governments. Though fire-resistant, the clothing WLFFs wear is 
much lighter and much less protective, because they need to work 
hard and fast over expansive terrain to corral and redirect masses of 
flame rather than to extinguish them.196 The tools WLFFs use are 
relatively primitive: chainsaws and Pulaskis (a combination hoe and 
pickaxe) to dig a fire line down through organic matter to the mineral 
layer of soils.197 
Further complicating matters is the dynamic created when different 
firefighting crews from different government jurisdictions, with 
different management mandates and organizational cultures are 
temporarily unified under the authority of whoever the designated 
incident commander at a fire scene is determined to be. The incident 
commander might be a local government fire chief or captain whose 
principal focus and experience is fighting structural fires. The 
commander might be a backcountry WLFF who takes something 
 
responders, and the team’s support staff. The team will also strive to minimize damage to 
public and private property as safety conditions allow.”). 
193 Id. 
194 See id. 
195 Firefighter protective equipment and clothing research, U.S. FIRE ADMIN., 
https://www.usfa.fema.gov/operations/ops_ppe.html (last reviewed Jan. 26, 2017). 
196 Id. 
197 Id. 
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more of a “let it burn” attitude toward trying to save structures whose 
owners had obviously done no meaningful fire mitigation work on 
their property. 
According to some accounts, it was this role confusion that killed 
the Granite Mountain Hotshots at Arizona’s Yarnell Hill fire. They 
had reached the limit of their ability to contain and redirect the 
wildfire sweeping over public lands.198 Their resource management 
efforts were at an end for the day, but the fire was now threatening a 
mountain town just down the road from their own.199 That 
backcountry crew lost their lives trying to protect urban structures.200 
A subsequent investigation of the incident revealed that Arizona 
officials had requested deployment of the Granite Mountain Hotshots 
under the federal dispatching authority of the National Interagency 
Fire Center.201 However, the Hotshots had recently come off an 
extended firefight elsewhere, and federal guidelines required a period 
of rest and recuperation before they could be deployed again.202 
Rather than follow these guidelines, the Prescott fire department 
deployed the Hotshots under its own authority, since the crew was 
officially a unit of that department.203 In their roles as federally 
recognized backcountry WLFFs, they would not have been sent to the 
fire, but in their role as wildland division members of a municipal fire 
department, they were sent to their deaths. 
B. Hidden Casualties in the War on Fire 
In addition to direct physical threats to their survival, WLFFs face 
an equally dangerous set of harms occasioned by the extreme 
psychological stress their work imposes on them. Since the Yarnell 
Hill disaster, as of the end of 2017, another thirty-eight WLFFs have 
lost their lives in the line of duty.204 This includes only those who died 
 
198 Dickman, supra note 181. 
199 Id. 
200 Id. 
201 John Dougherty, Yarnell Hill Fire: The Granite Mountain Hotshots Never 
Should’ve Been Deployed, Mounting Evidence Shows, PHX. NEW TIMES (Aug. 21, 2013, 
12:24 PM), http://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/content/printView/6656696. 
202 Id. 
203 Id. 
204 Wildland Fire Fatalities by Year, NAT. INTERAGENCY FIRE CTR, 31–36 (2017), 
https://www.nifc.gov/safety/safety_documents/year.pdf. 
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in field operations or in transit.205 Unrecorded and unacknowledged in 
these statistics are those who died by their own hand, either by suicide 
or suicidal behavior—usually after the fire season is over and they are 
on their own.206 
Numbers alone cannot tell the full story, but they are indeed 
sobering. In 2013 alone, six WLFFs took their own lives.207 
Compared to those who died in field operations or in transit, that’s a 
suicide rate of about 17 per 100,000208—far higher than the civilian 
rate, and roughly the same as military combat veterans.209 In 2016, as 
many firefighters lost their lives to suicide as died in field operations 
and in transit (thirteen).210 The highest rate appears to be among 
smokejumpers211—those who do what is arguably the most dangerous 
and life-threatening field work. Smokejumpers are deployed by 
aircraft into the back country to contain small fires before they 
become big ones.212 
As each year’s wildfire season lasts longer than the one before, 
firefighters are deployed for extended periods of time, meaning that 
their nervous systems spend more time primed for potential danger, 
just like military combatants. They are often chronically short of 
sleep, do not eat regularly, and are moved around continuously as 
fires change in size and direction, just like military combatants. At the 
end of the fire season, now late into the fall, their tight-knit field unit 
made up of strong, courageous brothers and sisters who had their 
backs is disbanded, leaving them sometimes feeling abandoned, 
vulnerable, and incredibly lonely—just like military combat 
veterans.213 
 
205 Id. (causes listed in chart). 
206 Paul Keller, Sharing Her Story, 7 WILDLAND FIRE LESSONS LEARNED CTR. 1, 4 
(2017), https://www.wildfirelessons.net/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.as 
hx?DocumentFileKey=a55c181e-fb3a-f374-8efa-e2d 5cfe1fa12&forceDialog=0. 
207 Gregg Zoroya, Wildfire Crews Battle PTSD, Much Like Soldiers of War, USA 
TODAY (Sept. 6, 2014, 6:01 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/09/06 
/climate-fires-firefighters-ptsd-strain/14061659/. 
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209 Id. 
210 See Keller, supra note 206. 
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212 Id. 
213 See Zoroya, supra note 207. 
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V 
IN DUBIOUS BATTLE 
A. The Casualties of Our Narratives 
When a nation goes to war, its leaders extol the courage and 
fortitude of combatants they are sending to fight and perhaps to die, 
but do not dwell long on what the true human costs of going to war 
are likely to be. We have plenty of historical evidence of this terrible 
toll, but it is usually either discounted or ignored altogether in the 
exciting run-up to the assault on the enemy. 
Only later does the human cost of such an endeavor fully come to 
light. If history pronounces the war as just and necessary, the costs are 
deemed to be worth it. But, if in retrospect it seems that the cause was 
flawed or ill-conceived, then—to use John Milton’s phrase—
combatants were sent into dubious battle,214 and the human cost may 
be adjudged to have been too much. John Steinbeck used the term as 
the title of his 1936 novel which details the sometimes brutal realities 
of organizing labor during the Great Depression.215 His tale is one of 
noble purpose sought by sometimes ignoble means—a moral 
quandary that it would take America decades to at least partially 
resolve through labor relations legislation. 
I argue that we face a similar quandary now. The Granite Mountain 
Hotshots lost their lives trying to defend the communities of Yarnell 
and Peeples Valley, Arizona.216 Neither of these communities were 
FireWise-rated, and their community wildfire protection plans existed 
on paper but not on the ground.217 This is dubious battle indeed. 
B. Moral Accounting for the War Narrative 
What this and similar incidents raise is a policy question most 
political leaders, land developers, home builders, and realtors do not 
want to hear. Namely, whether the very best and bravest of our 
WLFFs should be risking their lives trying to save communities in the 
WUI that have taken few or no meaningful steps to save themselves. 
This is a problem particularly in the local option states, where 
 
214 JOHN MILTON, PARADISE LOST 18 (Stephen Orgel & Jonathan Goldberg eds., 
Oxford Univ. Press 2008) (1667). 
215 JOHN STEINBECK, IN DUBIOUS BATTLE (Warren French ed., Penguin Books 2006) 
(1936). 
216 Dickman, supra note 181. 
217 KODAS, supra note 17, at ch. 29. 
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communities are under no obligation to do their part in protecting 
themselves from harm. But the time is long overdue for this question 
to be asked loudly and clearly, and for an open and honest debate to 
address these issues. 
In the Mountain West, largely unregulated development creates 
asymmetry between the benefits accruing to local development 
interests, both private and public, and the costs associated with 
fighting the monster fires that will inevitably threaten new 
communities in the WUI. Much of this new development abuts public 
lands, which forces federal inter-agency WLFFs to serve as a de facto 
national WUI fire department. Since residents in the WUI seldom tax 
themselves sufficiently to support a fire department able to defend 
their communities, federal WLFFs often have to step in.218 
By one estimate, “only about 16 percent of the WUI in the West is 
now developed,” though as that percentage increases the cost of 
fighting these fires could increase to anywhere between $2.3 and $4.3 
billion.219 We have already seen these increases: one study found the 
WUI increased by fifty-two percent from 1970 to 2000.220 As the 
WUI continues to increase, the burden on federal wildland 
firefighting services will grow that much heavier, right along with the 
growing perimeter WLFFs are called upon to defend. 
Twenty years ago, firefighting consumed about 13% of the USFS 
budget.221 By 2013, that figure had more than tripled.222 Furthermore, 
since Congress has flatlined the overall budget for the Forest Service, 
it has had to cannibalize fuel mitigation programs to cover the 
growing costs of fighting the fires it had been trying to prevent.223 
Over half the USFS budget is now devoted to firefighting,224 and most 
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of that in the WUI. That percentage is likely to go up, should 
Congress and the current presidential administration follow through 
on plans to further cut the USFS budget.225 
But how does one calculate the value of a fallen wildland 
firefighter? Or the burden of lifelong grief carried by his or her 
family, friends, and loved ones? Or the growing evidence of federal 
WLFFs who spend the ever-lengthening, months-long fire season 
fighting one giant catastrophic wildfire after another, while exhibiting 
the same symptoms of extreme psychological post-traumatic stress as 
military combat veterans? 
As a matter of public policy, our nation has finally come to accept 
responsibility for the well-being of those who risk their lives in 
uniformed service to our country abroad, including those sustaining 
serious psychological trauma during that service. We do this 
regardless of whether these are veterans of popular or unpopular wars. 
Yet, as a nation, we fail to care for our WLFFs with anything even 
approximating the level of support services for combat veterans.226 At 
least combat units have doctors and chaplains in the field: federally 
trained and deployed WLFFs usually have neither. 
There are two reasons for this. First, even with annual wildland 
firefighting budgets approaching a cumulative $2 billion dollar 
benchmark,227 we are still trying to fight fires on the cheap, even at 
the expense of our WLFFs’ wellbeing, and despite the growing 
severity of the wildfire threat. Second, acknowledgment of the human 
costs of fighting fires and the costs the public should bear to 
adequately care for WLFFs, it would bring forth much larger policy 
questions. Such questions may include whether our national 
interagency wildland firefighting services should continue to function 
as a national fire department. The time has come for that national 
conversation to begin. 
The necessity of potentially deadly public service duties rendered 
by urban first responders such as peace officers and structural 
 
225 TODAY: Cantwell Questions Trump Administration on Forest Service Budget, U.S. 
SENATE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES (June 15, 2017), https://www 
.energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2017/6/today-cantwell-questions-trump-administra 
tion-on-forest-service -budget. 
226 See Zoroya, supra note 207. 
227 Laura Zuckerman, Cost of fighting U.S. wildfires topped $2 billion in 2017, 
REUTERS (Sept. 14, 2017, 5:27 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-wildfires/cost 
-of-fighting-u-s-wildfires-topped-2-billion-in-2017-idUSKCN1BQ01F. 
BURTON(DO NOT DELETE) 5/14/2018  10:48 AM 
124 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 33, 87 
firefighters goes largely unquestioned, and is appropriately honored 
and rewarded by a grateful public. The public and its political leaders 
expect the same selfless sacrifice from WLFFs in the WUI. The 
problem arises when, prompted by enthusiastic local political support, 
land developers and real estate agents locate new WUI residents in 
high-risk environments, and then expect WLFFs to lay their lives on 
the line, just like urban structural firefighters, to protect a home that 
does not belong there. 
The plain truth is that the WLFFs trained, equipped, employed, and 
deployed by federal land management agencies are paid to manage 
and protect natural resources on public lands, not the private property 
next door. WLFFs work side by side with local WUI fire departments 
in Type I conflagrations when the latter are overwhelmed by the 
magnitude of the disaster before them.228 Local fire politics compel 
WLFFs to take on life-threatening missions in the WUI that, at least 
in the case of mixed forest and structural fires, they have not been 
trained, equipped, or adequately compensated to undertake.229 
These are not criticisms you will hear from the firefighters and 
their supervisors who are the subject of this Article. These people do 
not complain or shirk their responsibilities. The very nature of their 
work compels them to accept and fully commit to whatever mission 
he or she has been assigned. It is just this spirit that calls upon others 
to speak on behalf of the WLFFs, for they are not generally inclined 
to do so for themselves. 
VI 
THE WAY FORWARD: MAKING PEACE WITH NATURE 
A. Rewriting Narratives and Re-thinking Priorities 
Both the funding model and the allocation of responsibilities for 
firefighting in the WUI, as currently practiced, are ultimately 
unsustainable. Congress has tacitly acknowledged this by refusing to 
give federal land managers the funds they need to meet the growing 
demands for both wildfire mitigation and wildfire suppression on the 
lands entrusted to their care—especially those bordering private 
property. If Congress wants agencies to stand down from fighting 
fires on private lands within the WUI, then it should say so in the 
form of a legislative directive, not through budget caps and cuts. The 
 
228 See supra Section IV.A. 
229 See supra Section IV.A. 
BURTON (DO NOT DELETE) 5/14/2018  10:48 AM 
2018] In Dubious Battle: The Human Cost of  125 
Wildland Firefighting 
Forest Service, the Bureau of Land Management, and the National 
Park Service should no longer take the political hit for being unable to 
do what Congress has decided it will no longer fund them to do. 
Ultimately, federal wildland firefighting agencies will be compelled 
to start doing on a national scale what some rural local fire marshals 
have already begun to do. They will stop deploying scarce firefighting 
resources to areas where local governments do not use their police 
powers to compel residents to take full responsibility for mitigating 
their properties against wildfire. 
This is the policy crossroads at which we now stand. The reflexive 
and increasingly untenable pattern of response to the growing wildfire 
threat in the WUI is to simply scrounge up whatever personnel, 
equipment, and budget leftovers are available to stand against a threat 
that shows every sign of expanding and none of abating. The public 
keeps committing available resources to a struggle against climate-
driven natural forces and market-driven human desires that can only 
end in greater losses and larger defeats. 
This is, in fact, one of the most important reasons for abandoning 
the fire industrial complex narrative altogether. According to this 
framework, doing anything other than pouring more resources into 
relentless and unending conflict is an admission of defeat—a retreat 
from combat with the natural forces we have committed ourselves to 
conquer. 
As Michael Kodas points out, one of the reasons the war metaphor 
remains so compelling is that it is profitable.230 The fire-industrial 
complex, just like the military-industrial complex, relies on the 
narrative of war and the continuous stoking of public fears for 
survival.231 Sadly, some federal land managers have come to rely on 
this narrative for their survival as well.232 This narrative and those 
who enforce it are driven by perverse political incentives. While 
Congress refuses to allocate anything approximating the resources 
necessary to reconcile forest management with the realities of western 
fire ecology (e.g., prescribed burning and forest thinning), it makes 
funds far more readily available for firefighting.233 We annually 
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purchase billions of pounds of cure rather than just a few ounces of 
prevention. As is the case with the Pentagon, wars and rumors of wars 
are the means by which they receive their funding. 
As the casualty figures cited above tell us, the war narrative has 
deadly consequences for our WLFFs as well as residents of the WUI. 
Rampant residential land development in the western WUI creates 
settlements on dangerous, ecologically contested lands. The more 
local governments encourage such development and the less they 
regulate wildfire mitigation on private lands, the more they endanger 
the lives, health, and well-being of both the citizenry and the WLFFs 
who will inevitably be dispatched to aid them. 
From this view, taking better care of our WLFFs means changing 
the policy context within which they do their work. It means resigning 
ourselves to the perennial and ubiquitous presence of wildfire in the 
Mountain West. We need to recognize that the war on fire is 
ultimately unwinnable, because the war metaphor itself is a loser. We 
need to learn to live more knowledgeably with fire, to respect its often 
untamable power, and to no longer encourage people to live in its 
path. These are important ways we can lower the currently 
unacceptable human costs of wildland firefighting. 
B. A Narrative of Care 
In addition to creating a safer policy context within which WLFFs 
practice their craft, we, as a country, must also address their needs in 
the same way we do for others who have put themselves in harm’s 
way on our behalf. Unlike returning combat veterans, when the fire 
season comes to an end, seasonal WLFFs are literally on their own, 
many paying for therapy out of pocket.234 Further, seasonal WLFFs 
do not qualify for health insurance through the federal government at 
all, unless hurt on the job, where workman’s compensation will cover 
them.235 Any physical or mental afflictions they may have sustained 
on the fire line that do not manifest until after the season is over, they 
must see to themselves. At the very least, WLFFs are owed the same 
level of care—including off-season counseling—available to 
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returning veterans or full-time firefighters in other fire services. Such 
coverage should last at least until the next fire season starts. 
A poignant and heart-wrenching example of the disparate treatment 
of seasonal and full-time professional WLFFs manifested in the wake 
of the Yarnell Hill disaster. Over half of those who died on the 
Granite Mountain Hotshot crew were seasonal employees.236 This 
means that even though they worked just as hard, took the same risks, 
and ultimately lost their lives alongside permanent employees, their 
grieving widows (several of them young mothers) did not receive the 
same survivor benefits from the City of Prescott as the families of 
permanent employees.237 One such widow eventually went to court to 
shame the city into providing those benefits, and won.238 As a result, 
the nearby city of Tucson disbanded its wildland firefighting hotshot 
division.239 Prescott too no longer has a hotshot crew, and while some 
would argue it is now less protected from the wildfire menace than it 
was before the wildland division was created, the division has now 
begun active fire mitigation measures.240 
As is the case with seaside residential developments along the Gulf 
Coast and Atlantic seaboard, perhaps the time has come to recognize 
that allowing market forces to settle more and more people in harm’s 
way, committing more human and fiscal resources to a war against 
natural forces that is ultimately unwinnable, is both delusional and 
deadly. 
People enticed to move into harm’s way, and the first responders 
ordered to face those harms to save them, are both cannon fodder in 
an ongoing and unwinnable war waged against nature by real estate 
development interests and the local government officials who sustain 
and enable them. It is a deeply flawed and ultimately unsustainable 
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course of action. We owe it to those who willingly put themselves in 
harm’s way to ensure that the sacrifices they make for the public are 
done for morally defensible reasons. 
This is especially pertinent in the fire-threatened landscapes 
throughout the Mountain West and coastal United States. 
Approaching the winter solstice of 2017, climate change and its 
resultant shifts in weather patterns in the Pacific coastal United States 
are raining down a deluge of fire, when in seasons gone by, late fall 
rains would have quenched the early fall fires egged on by the Santa 
Ana winds.241 
This September, fires in northern California’s wine country were 
followed by backcountry fires that burned down into the heart of 
communities in the San Fernando Valley, up the coast, and into the 
mountains north of San Diego.242 Such fires remind us of the heavy 
price we pay to suppress fires that want to burn, and for inviting 
people to live in the path where those fires wanted to burn—where 
they have historically done their important cleansing, healing work. 
The policy choice before us now could hardly be more stark. We 
either continue to cling to the metaphor of war and thus make war on 
natural forces as if we could someday overcome them, or we make 
peace with nature. We must withdraw our wildland firefighting forces 
from unceasing and unwinnable conflict with the forces of nature. We 
should deploy them instead to work in partnership with those forces 
to replicate the fire ecology dominant throughout the Mountain West. 
And we should locate humans in places that natural forces have 
taught us are more safe and defensible. This is not retreat. It is 
peaceful co-existence. 
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